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SCEPTICISM AT THE BIRTH OF SATIRE:  
CARNEADES IN LUCILIUS’ CONCILIUM DEORUM 
 
 
The best-known fact about the interaction of the Republican Roman poet, Gaius Lucilius (c. 
180 B.C.E. – 103/2 B.C.E.),1 the inventor of the genre of Roman verse satire, with the 
doctrine of Scepticism is probably a statement of Cicero: that Clitomachus the Academician 
dedicated a treatise to the poet (Cic. Luc. 102).2 Diogenes Laertius makes much of that writer, 
Clitomachus’, industry (τὸ φιλόπονον, 4.67), with the comment: ‘to such lengths did his 
diligence (ἐπιμελείας) go that he composed more than four hundred treatises’.3 This 
phraseology surely reminds those interested in Lucilius’ influence on later Latin poetry of 
Horace’s disparaging comment, in hora saepe ducentos, | ut magnum, uersus dictabat (‘as a 
bravura display, he would often dictate two hundred verses in an hour’, Sat. 1.4.9-10); 
moreover, Horace shortly afterwards calls his predecessor garrulus atque piger scribendi 
                                                        
1 Fragments of Lucilius will be cited with the numberings of E.H. Warmington (ed.), Remains 
of Old Latin, III: Lucilius, The Twelve Tables (Cambridge, MA, 1938), and F. Marx, C. 
Lucilii Carminum Reliquiae (Leipzig, 1904-5); the text is that of Marx with deviations noted, 
and translations are largely adapted from those of Warmington. 
2 For this in conjunction with the idea that ‘philosophy at Rome was in the air’, see J.E.G. 
Zetzel, ‘Philosophy is in the Streets’, in G.D. Williams & K. Volk (edd.), Roman Reflections: 
Studies in Latin Philosophy (Oxford, 2015), 50-62, at 61. C. Cichorius, Untersuchungen zu 
Lucilius (Berlin, 1908), 47 goes too far in claiming that Lucilius was therefore an adherent of 
Academic philosophy. 
3 Carneades could also be made into a prolific philosopher by a later generation. Varro’s 
elaboration of the Carneadea divisio on natural ends reached the number 288: E. Rawson, 
Intellectual Life in the Roman Republic (London, 1985), 139. 
2 
 
 
ferre laborem (‘talkative and too lazy to bear the work of writing’, 1.4.12). Yet a sceptical 
view of Horace’s critique might have to think of Lucilius as hard-working, like his putative 
friend the Academic philosopher, Clitomachus.4 
However, the second-best known fact about Lucilius and Scepticism, which will occupy 
the remainder of this discussion, is a reference by the satirist in his Book One, the official 
start to Lucilius’ poetry in hexameters, to Carneades, whom we might call the oral-argument-
only Socrates to Clitomachus’ Plato.5 All commentators agree that the reference occurs in the 
book’s Concilium deorum (‘Council of the Gods’). At this meeting of the gods, a man named 
Lupus, most likely the Roman politician and judge Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, 
quondam consul (156 B.C.E.), censor (147), and princeps senatus (131 onwards), was put on 
trial. That trial reflects an historical trial de repetundis which occurred between Lupus’ 
consulship and censorship. As Valerius Maximus puts it (6.9.10): 
 
                                                        
4 Clitomachus is also associated with Lucius Censorinus in the same passage of Cicero’s 
Lucullus, with the result that his ‘practical credentials’ are ‘highlighted’: R. Woolf, Cicero: 
The Philosophy of a Roman Sceptic (London, 2015), 28. Interestingly, Censorinus features in 
Valerius Maximus’ anecdote about Lupus’ political trajectory (6.9.10, discussed below). 
5 Note, though, that Carneades’ pronouncements were ‘not in dialogical, question-and-answer 
form’: L. Castagnoli, ‘How Dialectical was Stoic Dialectic?’, in A. Nightingale and D. 
Sedley (edd.), Ancient Models of Mind: Studies in Human and Divine Rationality 
(Cambridge, 2010), 153-79, at 156. A.M. Ioppolo, ‘L’assenso nella filosofia di Clitomaco: un 
problema di linguaggio?’ in A.M. Ioppolo and D. Sedley (edd.), Pyrrhonists, Patricians, 
Platonizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155-86 B.C. (Rome, 2007), 225-67 
challenges the usual identification of Clitomachus’ role as that of an unquestioning scribe. 
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Let us now look at the variety of men’s fortunes. L. Lentulus [Lupus], a Consular, after 
conviction on a charge of extortion under the Caecilian law (lege Caecilia 
repetendarum), was elected Censor with L. Censorinus. Fortune turned him this way and 
that between honours and disgraces, following Consulship with conviction, conviction 
with Censorship, suffering him neither to enjoy lasting good nor bewail unchanging bad. 
 
The dating is problematic, because there is no record of a lex Caecilia concerning 
repetundae. It could be argued, as many have, that lex Caecilia is a confusion for the more 
famous lex Calpurnia de repetundis of 149 B.C.E.,6 which set up the first standing court to 
try such cases before a senatorial jury. However, on balance the lex Caecilia is likely to have 
been a tribune’s special measure, with an ad hoc court as for (or even part of) the accusation 
of praetors auaritiae nomine in 153 B.C.E. (Liv. Per. 47).7 Carneades was in Rome in 155 
B.C.E., as part of a famous embassy to Rome on behalf of Athens, who were appealing to the 
                                                        
6 ‘Aus Versehen’: T. Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig, 1899), 708 n.3; see e.g. W.S. 
Ferguson, ‘The Lex Calpurnia of 149 B.C.’, JRS 11 (1921), 86-100, at 100. 
7 K. Freudenburg, ‘Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis: Censors in the Afterworld’, in S. Bartsch and 
A. Schiesaro (edd.), The Cambridge Companion to Seneca (Cambridge, 2015), 93-105, at 98-
100 especially, follows R.A. Bauman, Lawyers in Roman Republican Politics: A Study of the 
Roman Jurists in their Political Setting, 316-82 BC (Munich, 1983), 205-6; cf. E.S. Gruen, 
Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 11, who supports the 
earlier date based on Lentulus’ inability to commit extortion in the 140s. See T.C. Brennan, 
The Praetorship in the Roman Republic (Oxford, 2000), 235, with the note at 349. It has been 
noted to me by Loren J. Samons that it was proconsuls who were tried de repetundis—hence 
P.T. Eden, Seneca: Apocolocyntosis (Cambridge, 1984), 16 calls Lupus one—but I find no 
evidence for him holding this office. 
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Romans to overrule the arbitration of the Sicyonians which had imposed a punitive fine, after 
an Athenian raid on Oropus (Pausanias 7.11.4-8).8 If the arraignment of Lupus and the 
appearance of Carneades in Rome were remembered as roughly contemporaneous events for 
Lucilius, then there may be grounds to posit a conflation of the two events in the imaginary 
Concilium deorum, even if it was written some time afterwards. 
The motivation for this article is the fragment of the Concilium to which I have referred, 
preserved by Lactantius (Inst. 5.14.3),9 who cites it by indicating that Neptune spoke, 
presumably in a meeting of some kind, to say that a difficult matter was impossible to explain 
(disserens Neptunus de re difficillima ostendit non posse id explicari), non Carneaden si 
ipsum Orcus remittat (‘not if the Underworld were to send back Carneades himself’, 35 
Warmington = 31 Marx).10 Since Neptune’s statement implies that Carneades is dead, his 
                                                        
8 Some of the vast bibliography is cited by J.G.F. Powell, ‘The Embassy of the Three 
Philosophers to Rome in 155 BC’, in C. Kremmydas and K. Tempest (edd.), Hellenistic 
Oratory: Continuity and Change (Oxford, 2013), 219-47, at 231 n. 25, and passim. E.A. 
Schmidt, Musen in Rom: Deutung von Welt und Geschichte in grossen Texten der römischen 
Literatur (Tübingen, 2001), 33 is alone in treating, albeit briefly, the embassy as relevant to 
Lucilius’ Concilium.  
9 For doubts about the accuracy of Lactantius, who ascribes a whole speech in Cic., Rep. 3, 
spoken by Philus, to Carneades, see J. Glucker, ‘Carneades in Rome—Some Unsolved 
Problems’, in J.G.F. Powell and J.A. North (edd.), Cicero’s Republic (London, 2001), 57-82.  
10 This fragment has been assigned to the first book since Dousa’s edition. W. Krenkel, 
Lucilius: Satiren (Leiden, 1970), 1.64 places the fragment later in Book One than other 
commentators, because he connects it with the judgement of Lupus—i.e. that even Carneades 
would not know what to do with him. 
5 
 
 
death in 129/8 B.C.E. provides a terminus post quem for the satire.11 The fragmentary 
statement is part of an adynaton, combined with an a fortiori argument: x would not happen 
even if something impossible happened, so how much less could it happen if that 
impossibility has not happened.12 Lucilius’ Neptune is not advocating that Carneades should 
return, or even that he might return; the statement’s force, rather, is that there is a limit to the 
power of the gods, who cannot even obtain the services of Carneades as an explicator, and 
thus must remain fallible and perplexed rather than omniscient and omnipotent. Were 
Carneades to be available, he would still not be able to provide clarity.  
Why mention Carneades? Is it because he is an arbitrary choice, a casually mentioned 
emblematic philosopher, replaceable by a Socrates, Aristotle, or Zeno? That is certainly 
possible, if reductive.13 This paper aims to serve as a thought-experiment, though, to see 
whether the implications of the testimonia concerning Carneades, especially in Cicero and 
Diogenes Laertius, can be reasonably, if tentatively, linked to Lucilius’ Concilium. The key 
assumption is that mentioning Carneades, even to say he will not appear before the 
Concilium, makes a reader of Lucilian satire think of the embassy of the philosophers and 
                                                        
11 J. Michelfeit, ‘Zum Aufbau des ersten Buches des Lucilius’, Hermes 93 (1965), 113-28, at 
125. F. Muecke, ‘Rome’s First Satirists: Ennius and Lucilius’, in K. Freudenburg (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire (Cambridge, 2005), 33-47, at 43-4 merely states 
without elaboration: ‘His recent death was topical and suited the subject of the satire’. 
12 I owe this formulation to an anonymous reader, with thanks. 
13 The possibility is concomitant with the status of the adynaton figure as a type of proverb, 
as concluded by G.O. Rowe, ‘The Adynaton as a Stylistic Device’, AJPh 86 (1965), 387-96. 
6 
 
 
wonder, what if he were to appear?14 Another important assumption is that Lucilius knew of 
facts surrounding the biography of Carneades and used them in his poetry. I also revivify the 
idea that Lucilius’ mention of Carneades suggests that his Concilium owes a certain debt to 
the work of the hexametrical philosophizing poet Timon of Phlius. 
This article utilises persona theory, which has dominated the criticism of Roman verse 
satire for several decades,15 most fundamentally holding that the narrator of satire is not 
responsible for the views in his satire, but also reaches beyond it to adopt a relatively 
historicist position. In this reading, Carneades’ adoption of opposing viewpoints, interaction 
with Stoic thought, and putative resistance to divinity are all grist to the mill of Lucilius’ 
satiric practice. In the first section, it is important that Carneades was seen, like Lucilius, to 
hold Stoic points of view for the sake of argument. While it is still assumed that anything 
Lucilius wrote in his poetry could be taken, and was taken in antiquity, as the authentic voice 
of Lucilius, regardless of its viewpoint, aesthetic, or internal narrator (in the case of the 
motivating fragment, Neptune), I will argue that it is important that the speaker of the line 
was Neptune. And in the third section I show that Carneades was a figure of fun about whom 
anecdotes could be told, in a way like Timon’s vignettes of philosophers in the Underworld. 
We can thus tell a story, in an explication which has never been attempted at length before,16 
                                                        
14 Note the re- of remittat: one reason for it being ‘second time around’ would be that 
Carneades had already been before the Roman senate in 155 B.C.E. (no matter that he was 
alive, that time). 
15 Influentially stated in W.S. Anderson, Essays in Roman Satire (Princeton, 1982), 3-10. Cf. 
R. Mayer, ‘Persona(l) Problems: The Literary Persona in Antiquity Revisited’, MD 50 
(2003), 55-80, especially at 71-8.  
16 For instance, K. Hass, Lucilius und der Beginn der Persönlichkeitsdichtung in Rom 
(Stuttgart, 2007), 76-89 on Lucilius’ apparent philosophy has only one page (77) on the key 
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of how Lucilius may have drawn on philosophical attitudes and biographical details in 
inventing the genre of satire17—even within the limits imposed by the scanty nature of the 
fragments.  
 
I. BOTH SIDES NOW 
 
Carneades’ putative role as powerful explicator is somewhat strange, as it is set up to fail. As 
part of the 155 B.C.E. embassy of philosophers, it was he who especially dazzled his listeners 
by arguing, in some extra-ambassadorial capacity, perhaps in public lectures on successive 
days, first in favour of and then against just that topic, pertinent to Lucilius’ Concilium, of 
justice (Plut. Cat. Mai. 22; Cic. Rep. 3.6).18 Cato is recorded as expressing some displeasure 
at the imputed attack on conventional Roman morality (by the Elder Pliny, HN 7.112, as well 
as Plutarch). If this story is true, then at first glance Neptune is not entirely justified in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
fragment, and ends her overview with an accurate but uninspiring conclusion: ‘Lucilius ist 
nicht Stoiker, Epikureer oder Akademiker—er ist Lucilius’ (89). 
17 Cf. D. Dutsch, ‘The Beginnings: Philosophy in Roman Literature before 155 B.C.’, in M. 
Garani and D. Konstan (edd.), The Philosophizing Muse: The Influence of Greek Philosophy 
on Roman Poetry (Newcastle, 2014), 1-25, at 21 on Lucilius’ unsympathetic treatment of all 
schools in the surviving fragments: ‘Significantly, all the philosophers come under criticism’. 
Krenkel (n. 10), 2.435 elliptically comments on Lucilius’ mention of Polemon (and 
Xenocrates?), ‘Lucilius kannte ... die Geschichte der Akademie’. 
18 Powell (n. 8), esp. 237-45, is keen to scotch the existence of these extra-senatorial lectures 
as impossible to verify, and indeed as Cicero’s invention. While that is certainly possible, it 
seems plausible that the tradition of Carneades’ doings in Rome, and especially the for-and-
against nature of his discourses there, must have sprung up soon after the visit.  
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invoking Carneades’ ability to solve knotty problems. For if he is thinking of Carneades as an 
authority, the double-edged and contradictory answer he might, on the evidence of the 
philosophers’ embassy, receive to any query might disappoint and confuse an already 
confused situation.  
Carneades, as the leader of the Sceptical Academy, argued for a complex view of belief, 
in which it is possible to separate assent to the truth of an impression from approval of it (Cic. 
Luc. 104).19 Part of his method was to take on the opposing position to expose it to criticism, 
the tactic labelled in utramque partem disputare, with the aim being ‘to convict the dogmatist 
of irrationality of various sorts: of inconsistency in his beliefs or in the grounds he offers for 
his beliefs’.20 Thus Carneades, in responding to charges that the Sceptic suspends judgement 
and thus cannot act or indeed lead a good life, may have adapted the Stoic criterion of what 
was ‘plausible’ or ‘persuasive’, in order to argue nihilistically against it.21 Taking on the Stoic 
position for the sake of argument complicates the nature of the author’s propria persona and 
casts doubt on whether the wise man can hold opinions.22 That formulation recalls persona 
                                                        
19 Cf. C. Perin, ‘Scepticism and Belief’, in R. Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Ancient Scepticism (Cambridge, 2010), 145-64, at 149-50. 
20 M. Schofield, ‘Cicero for and against Divination’, JRS 76 (1986), 47-65, at 55. Cf. Cic. 
Luc. 131: non quo probaret sed ut opponeret Stoicis (‘not because he held it himself but in 
order to combat the Stoics with it’).  
21 K.M. Vogt, ‘Scepticism and Action’, in R. Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Ancient Scepticism (Cambridge, 2010), 165-80, at 170. Cf. Y. Baraz, A Written Republic: 
Cicero’s Philosophical Politics (Princeton, 2012), 134 (with references) on how Cicero’s 
probabile (translating Carneades’ πιθανόν, ‘believable’) ‘refers to rhetorical persuasion’.  
22 As at Cic. Luc. 78, cf. A.M. Ioppolo, Opinione e scienza: il dibattito tra Stoici e 
Accademici nel III e nel II secolo a. C. (Naples, 1986), 195. 
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theory as it is applied to Roman satire: the idea that Carneades adopted Stoic positions to 
which he was opposed is analogous to the vision of Lucilius as a Stoic propagated by 
scholars, based in part on his similarity to long-winded Stoics in Horace’s Satires 1.23 Several 
fragments of Lucilius, not from the Concilium, have been interpreted as taking on Stoic 
positions.24 But if Lucilius was taking Carneadean practice as a model, it is not difficult to 
reconcile such claims with Porphyrio’s comment (ad Hor. Sat. 1.3.124)—in preserving 1189-
90 Warmington = 1225-6 Marx, which adopts the Stoic paradox, ‘only the wise man is 
                                                        
23 Cf. the treatment of Lucilius as involved with Stoic anticompositional theories of 
grammatical arrangement in Horace’s Satires: see K. Freudenburg, The Walking Muse: 
Horace on the Theory of Satire (Princeton, 1993), 109-19, 132-9, 145-62. I. Mariotti, Studi 
Luciliani (Florence, 1960), 40 claims that Panaetius via Scipio Aemilianus necessarily 
infused Lucilius with Stoic ideas, though note W.R. Raschke, ‘Arma pro amico: Lucilian 
Satire at the Crisis of the Roman Republic’, Hermes 115 (1987), 299-318, at 302-3. 
24 749 Warmington = 738 Marx, certa sunt sine detrimento quae inter sese commodent 
(‘There are established things which men may give and take on loan among themselves 
without disadvantage’, cf. Cic. Off. 1.51); the infamous uirtus fragment (1196-208 
Warmington = 1326-38 Marx), which W. Görler, ‘Zum virtus-Fragment des Lucilius (1326-
1338 Marx) und zur Geschichte der stoischen Güterlehre’, Hermes 112 (1984), 445-68 sees 
as Stoic, partly accepted by Dutsch (n. 18), 22-3, though E.S. Gruen, Culture and National 
Identity in Republican Rome (Ithaca, NY, 1992), 310 thinks it is straight parody; W.R. 
Raschke, ‘The Virtue of Lucilius’, Latomus 49 (1990), 352-69, at 364-5 claims it to be 
practical Roman moralising, rejecting Greek influence.  
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handsome’—that Lucilius ‘spoke in mockery of the Stoics’.25 Lucilius may have advocated 
arguments he opposed in order to tear them down. 
The possibility that the Sceptic need not take a position on assent or adherence has 
implications for Carneades’ abilities as an explicator,26 and indeed for Lupus as a judge who 
has to come down in favour of one side (excessive cruelty in which role is a factor in 
Lucilius’ critique of him in a fragment from Lucilius Book 28, 805-11 Warmington = 784-90 
Marx).27 That is why it is a surprise to find Carneades serving as a judge, in the telling of 
Cicero: ‘Carneades was accustomed to judge the controversy [of Peripatetics versus Stoics] 
as if a respected arbitrator’ (quorum controversiam solebat tamquam honorarius arbiter 
iudicare Carneades, Tusc. 5.120).28 Yet Cicero, inspired by Carneades, is usually at pains to 
                                                        
25 See A. Chahoud, ‘Romani ueteres atque urbani sales: A Note on Cicero De Oratore 2.262 
and Lucilius 173M’, in C.S. Kraus, J. Marincola, & C. Pelling (edd.), Ancient Historiography 
and its Contexts: Studies in Honour of A. J. Woodman (Oxford, 2010), 87-96, at 94. 
26 See e.g. M. Frede, ‘The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility 
of Knowledge’, in R. Rorty, J. Scheewind, and Q. Skinner (edd.), Philosophy in History 
(Cambridge, 1984), 225-54, at 267-71, on the controversial interpretation of Carneades on 
opinions proposed by Catulus (and held by his father) at Cic. Luc. 148. 
27 I have work on this fragment under review elsewhere, and so do not treat it here; F. Ahl, 
Metaformations: Soundplay and Wordplay in Ovid and Other Classical Poets (Ithaca, NY, 
1985), 95-7 is one of many to note that Lupus’ overly harsh judgements are the basis for 
Lucilius’ critique of him. 
28 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.7 on arbitration: ‘but let everyone defend his views, for judgment is free’. 
I. Gildenhard, Paideia Romana: Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations (Cambridge, 2007), 201-3 
analyses Cicero’s statements at Tusc. 4.5-7 in terms of writing under Caesar’s dominatus. 
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exercise free judgment (liberum iudicium),29 which at least superficially resembles how 
Lucilius is supposed to have branded wrongdoers multa cum libertate (‘with great freedom’, 
Hor. Sat. 1.4.5). While this latter ‘freedom of speech’ (parrhesia) is not exactly a 
philosophical concept attached to Sceptics such as freedom from care (ataraxia), being rather 
a Cynic trait, it is easy to see how a cod-philosophical interpretation might have developed 
whereby the two could be conflated.  
Another area where Carneadean method may come into play in the satiric Concilium is 
connected to a fragment deemed by all editors to have come from it. It deals with a change in 
terminological usage, regarding the names to use for mundane furnishings which would be 
visible in a sympotic setting (15-16 Warmington = 15-16 Marx):30  
 
porro ‘clinopodas’ ‘lychnos’que ut diximus semnos 
ante ‘pedes lecti’ atque ‘lucernas’  
 
what’s more, those ‘clinipods’ and ‘lanterns’, as we said before/instead of with gravitas 
‘bed-feet’ and ‘lamps’ 
 
                                                        
29 Characterized by Atticus as ‘freedom of argumentation’ (libertas disserendi, Leg. 1.36); in 
that context, Cicero’s argument is said to lack such Carneadean freedom, owing to his 
dependence on sources, but he counters the charge as necessary to deal with so important a 
matter as the Republic, and, in any case, he has exercised free judgment by choosing one 
source: J.W. Atkins, Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: The Republic and Laws 
(Cambridge, 2013), 179-84. 
30 Mariotti (n. 23), 53-4 notes the sympotic context.  
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The transmission of the fragment by Macrobius (6.18), though he does at least ascribe it to 
Book One, has made much about this fragment unclear, especially what the speaker, possibly 
Romulus the newest god,31 means by ut diximus semnos | ante. Interpretation rests on 
uncertainties: whether ut diximus semnos ante goes together with the Greek words before or 
the Latin ones after it; whether semnos is joined to ante or there is an opposition between 
porro (‘from now on’) and ante (‘in the past’); whether ut diximus is joined to semnos | ante; 
whether semnos is a positive value (‘authoritatively’) or is negative (‘pretentiously’);32 and 
whether ante actually means ‘beforehand’ or just transliterates ἀντί, ‘instead’. I would argue 
that the commonly held interpretation, that Lucilius is here commenting on the moral 
dysfunction in the replacement of prosaic but apposite Latin terms by highfaluting yet elegant 
Greek ones,33 is too severe. In this fragment, the -que ending tacked onto the Greek word, the 
use of the description σεμνῶς and the possibility that ante means ‘instead’ all indicate the 
speaker’s Greek fluency. Therefore, if the speaker is condemning the replacement of Latin 
words with fashionable Greek ones, then the argument is undermined by the further Greek in 
                                                        
31 See Cichorius (n. 2), 228; C.J. Classen, ‘Grundlagen und Absicht der Kritik des Lucilius’, 
in C. Klodt (ed.), Satura lanx: Festschrift für Werner A. Krenkel zum 70. Geburtstag 
(Hildesheim, 1996), 11-28, at 17 is more cautious. 
32 σεμνῶς has a literary-critical role, as Aristotle uses it to describe the use of unfamiliar 
words at Poet. 1458a21. See J.N. Adams, Bilingualism and the Latin Language (Cambridge, 
2003), 327 and now C. Whitton, Pliny the Younger: Epistles Book II (Cambridge, 2013), 176. 
Arist. Rhet. 1406b3-7 characterizes τὸ σεμνόν as epic, then tragic, cf. M. Puelma Piwonka, 
Lucilius und Kallimachos: Zur Geschichte einer Gattung der Hellenistisch-Römischen Poesie 
(Frankfurt, 1949), 14. 
33 As argued by T. Baier, ‘Lucilius und die griechischen Wörter’, in G. Manuwald, Der 
Satiriker Lucilius und seine Zeit (Munich, 2001), 37-50, at 41. 
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σεμνῶς and (possibly) ἀντί.34 By giving alternatives, the satirist (via his divine characters) 
could simply be refusing to decide: a move counter to the spirit of a concilium where a 
judgement has to be made, but one which would be familiar to a Sceptic like Carneades who 
insists on the philosopher’s ‘suspension of judgement’ (ἐποχή).35 It is after all unclear in 
what language Carneades would have chosen to speak, had he appeared before the 
Concilium:36 in 155 the ambassadors’ case was presented in a Latin translation by the senator 
C. Acilius.37  
For his part, Carneades’ amaneuensis Clitomachus was from Carthage, with the original 
name Hasdrubal.38 Whether or not he was present at the embassy of 155, it is noteworthy that 
he was not Carneades’ only transcriber. Carneades is said to have griped ungratefully that 
Clitomachus repeated the substance of his teaching, but Charmadas reproduced the style as 
well (eodem etiam modo, Cic. Orat. 51). The issue seems to be one of the survival of 
ephemeral Carneadean discourse after the event, and it raises the question of how well 
Lucilius might have reproduced the mannerisms of the participants in the original meetings of 
                                                        
34 H. Petersmann, ‘The Language of Early Roman Satire: Its Function and Characteristics’, in 
J.N. Adams and R.G. Mayer (edd.), Aspects of the Language of Latin Poetry (Oxford, 1999), 
289-310, at 298 thinks Ennius’ use of Greek is Lucilius’ target.   
35 Cicero uses a fragment of Lucilius (1249 Warmington = 1305 Marx) to illustrate ἐποχή 
(Att. 13.21.3). 
36 For the question, see Schmidt (n. 8), 33. Cf. Sen. Apocol. 5.2 on Claudius. 
37 Gell. 6.14.9, Plut. Cat. 22.4; see E.S. Gruen, Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy 
(Leiden, 1990), 176. 
38 Cicero comments, perhaps somewhat acidly (implying ‘Punic faith’), that ‘he was a clever 
man, as you’d expect from a Carthaginian’ (Luc. 98). 
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the 150s in his Concilium of several decades later. Relevant, therefore, are Cicero’s 
observations on one of Clitomachus’ sets of Carneadean notes (Cic. Tusc. 3.54): 
 
I have read the book which Clitomachus sent by way of comfort to his captive fellow-
citizens after the destruction of Carthage; it contains in its pages a lecture of Carneades 
which Clitomachus says he had entered in his notebook: the question that had been 
proposed for discussion was that the wise man, it seemed, would feel distress at the fall of 
his country, and the arguments used by Carneades in opposing this proposition are given 
at length. The remedy therefore effectively applied to a recent disaster by the philosopher 
is one which no one even feels the want of in a disaster of long standing.  
 
One wonders whether Lucilius’ Concilium, written by Clitomachus’ dedicatee, and coming as 
it does so long after the fact of the contemporary embassy and extortion trial, replies to the 
last sentence of the extract. Note that the arguments supposedly marshalled by Carneades in 
this case are negative ones only—Clitomachus, with his vested interest, may well have 
provided his own positive ones. We cannot retrieve what Carneades actually believed: it is 
not for nothing that, in a different context (the defence of Calliphon’s arguments), 
‘Clitomachus used to declare that he had never been able to understand what Carneades did 
accept’ (Luc. 139).  
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II. GOD’S OWN COUNCIL 
 
The fragment about Greek and Latin word choices bears further examination in relation to 
Lucilius’ and Carneades’ attitudes to divinity.39 Granted that diximus is not the same as 
dicebamus, and the reference is perhaps to a previous speech made in this self-same 
concilium,40 if ante does mean ‘beforehand’ the fragment could be a dig at Neptune, who 
uttered 35 Warmington = 31 Marx.41 So, too, all former councils are recalled, including the 
previous trial of Lupus de repetundis, after which he nevertheless made a political comeback, 
and the embassy of the philosophers. It has been thought that 19 Warmington = 26 Marx, 
‘Vellem cumprimis, fieri si forte potisset,’ (‘especially could I wish, if by chance it had been 
possible to happen …’), and 20-2 Warmington = 27-9 Marx, uel<lem> concilio uestrum, 
quod dicitis olim | caelicolae <hic habitum, uellem> adfuissemus priore | concilio (‘I could 
wish that at that parliament of yourselves, which you say, O heaven-dwellers, was once held 
here—that we had been present at that former parliament’) are both also spoken by 
Neptune.42 These fragments may recall the context of Odyssey 5.280-90, when he laments his 
                                                        
39 On the language issue, there are newer Roman gods such as Liber, Janus, and Quirinus in 
attendance (24-7 Warmington = 21-2 Marx), not to mention Lupus. A. Chahoud, ‘The Roman 
Satirist Speaks Greek’, Classics Ireland 11 (2004), 1-46, at 29 raises the possibility that ‘the 
gods were imagined to speak an idiom of their own’. 
40 Puelma Piwonka (n. 32), 30-1. 
41 For Lucilius on further mortal imitation of divine banquets, see also 469 Warmington = 
444 Marx, idem epulo cibus atque epulae Iouis omnipotentis (‘the same food and festive 
dishes in a feast of all-powerful Jupiter’), with e.g. Marx (n. 1), 2.165. 
42 These fragments stem from different sources, hence the split: the former is preserved by 
pseudo-Asconius, the latter in Rufinianus’ de Figuris Sententiarum. 
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absence from the council expressly held without him (Od. 1.22-6), on his way from a visit to 
the ‘blameless Ethiopians’ where he had enjoyed a feast (δαιτί, 1.26).43 Quite aside from a 
divine predilection for banqueting, Neptune’s judgement and sense of timing may be being 
called into question.44 
It is additionally trenchant that Neptune, of all gods, is made to mention Carneades’ 
name. Carneades was famous for performing a reductio ad risibile of Stoic arguments via the 
so-called ‘theological sorites’, or ‘heap’:45 Stoics were ‘true pantheists’, who believed, 
absurdly in Carneades’ view, in the ‘presence of the divine rational element in all of 
nature’.46 Neptune is explicitly part of that Carneadean sorites (Sextus Empiricus M 9.182-3): 
‘If Zeus is a god, Poseidon too is a god …. But if Poseidon is a god, Achelous too will be a 
                                                        
43 G.C. Fiske, Lucilius and Horace: A Study in the Classical Tradition of Imitation (Madison, 
1920), 153, who quotes Il. 1.423 (the epithet is not Odyssean).  
44 Intriguingly, the book of Clitomachus dedicated to Lucilius covered the same subjects as 
an earlier work of the same author dedicated to somebody else (Cic. Luc. 102): such a do-
over is much like the holding of a new council. 
45 Cf. Cic. N.D. 3.44, where Carneades is named; P.A. Meijer, Stoic Theology: Proofs for the 
Existence of the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods (Delft, 2007), 180-206. For the 
sorites, see e.g. M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Gods and Heaps’, in M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (edd.), 
Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982), 315-38, at 
326-8. 
46 D. Frede, ‘Theodicy and Providential Care in Stoicism’, in D. Frede and A. Laks (edd.), 
Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath 
(Leiden, 2002), 85-117, at 112. 
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god’.47 The result of the sorites is to prove that gods cannot be omnipresent or omnipotent. 
Neptune serves as part of Carneades’ own critique of divine power and ubiquity—which 
makes his citation of the philosopher naive at best.48 
Neptune may be diminished purely by daring to mention, in divine council, the name 
Carneades which carries such associations. Another fragment of Lucilius mentions Lupus, the 
accused at the Concilium, in the same breath as a Neptuni filius (Cic. N.D. 1.63): 
 
quid de sacrilegis, quid de impiis periurisque dicemus?  
‘Tubulus si Lucius umquam 
si Lupus aut Carbo [aut del. Scaliger] Neptuni filius’  
(1138-9 Warmington = 1312-13 Marx) 
—ut ait Lucilius – putasset esse deos, tam periurus, aut tam impurus fuisset?  
 
                                                        
47 For Carneades as a positive atheist, or at least an agnostic via ‘suspension of judgement’ 
(cf. Sextus Empiricus M 9.191), see D. Sedley, ‘From the Pre-Socratics to the Hellenistic 
Age’, in S. Bullivant and M. Ruse (edd.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Oxford, 2013), 
139-51, at 147-50; T. Whitmarsh, Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World (London, 
2016), 161-5. 
48 Cf. A. A. Long, ‘Scepticism about Gods in Hellenistic Philosophy’, in M. Griffith and D.J. 
Mastronarde [edd.], Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature 
in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer (Atlanta, 1990), 279-91, at 287: ‘nor is it difficult to 
imagine Carneades anticipating Plutarch in ridiculing the very notion of perishable gods’. See 
e.g. H. Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 2009), 60-5 on the nuances of 
Carneades’ arguments (as represented at Cic. N.D. 3.29-34).  
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What are we to say about the men guilty of sacrilege or impiety or perjury? ‘Suppose that 
ever Lucius Tubulus, or Lupus or Carbo, [or] the son of Neptune’, as Lucilius says, had 
ever believed in the gods, would he have been such a perjurer or a scoundrel? 
 
Although this fragment’s book number, and indeed substance, are unclear, the ‘son of 
Neptune’ referred to here is surely not the Cyclops Polyphemus, despite the claim of all 
editors of Lucilius, but instead a historical figure of the same order as the other three 
personages mentioned—or a description of Carbo.49 If the reference is not literal, it gains 
force because, as with Carneades, Neptune did not have to be mentioned but is linked to the 
wrongdoers, one of whom he may be presiding over in judgement in the lost surrounding 
context.50 While, of course, the sins of the son are not to be visited on the father, Neptune is 
not entirely free from blame if his own (supposed) son refuses to believe in his (Neptune’s) 
divinity; his title as ‘father’ is highlighted in the Concilium proceedings (Neptunus pater, 26 
Warmington = 20 Marx, also preserved by Lactantius, Inst. 4.3.12).51  
                                                        
49 Contra e.g. the bald statement of Krenkel (n. 10), 2.705. I do not follow the justification of 
Marx (n. 1), 2.419 that this is the ‘wit of a most elegant poet who has mixed in his satire the 
human with the divine, immortal with mortal, living and dead’. See the important discussion 
of A. S. Pease, ‘The Son of Neptune’, HSCPh 54 (1943), 69-82. 
50 The early Lucilian editor Dousa assigned the fragment to Book 1, though Cichorius (n. 2), 
347 guesses that its place is somewhere in Books 2 to 10, on complex dating grounds 
(between 119 and 112 B.C.E., he claims). 
51 Cf. the scenario sketched by J.H. Waszink, ‘Zur ersten Satire des Lucilius’, in D. 
Korzeniewski (ed.), Die römische Satire (Darmstadt, 1970), 267-74, at 270, where Neptune 
speaks against Rome and in Lupus’ defence; see also S. Romano Martin, El tópico 
grecolatino del concilio de los dioses (Hildesheim, 2009), 171 on the ‘humanization’ of 
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Cicero has reproduced the Neptuni filius fragment in the context of a discussion of the 
existence of gods, a topic relevant to both the Carneadean sorites and Lucilius’ Concilium. 
We may remember that Carneades probably denied the existence of everlasting gods.52 Now, 
if we see Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis as belonging to a Lucilian tradition, then the Neronian 
author’s dead Claudius, candidate for deification, who is presented as ‘a new kind of beast’, 
so strange-looking that even Hercules has trouble identifying him (5.2-3), could contain 
elements of the earlier portrayal of the resurrected Lupus.53 Lupus’ (supposed) moral 
lassitude manifests itself in physical form, at fragment 52 Warmington = 53 Marx, serpere uti 
gangraena malum [Müller for Marx’s malo] atque herpestica posset (‘so that the snake-like 
gangrene could come creeping horribly’). The movement here is, at face value, indicative of 
disease and death.54 Lupus also looks ‘like death’: uultus item ut facies mors, icterus [for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Neptune in the Carneades fragment and attack on Apollo’s divination, the latter not treated 
here. 
52 Cf. S. Knuuttila & J. Sihvola, ‘Ancient Scepticism and Philosophy of Religion’, in J. 
Sihvola (ed.), Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition (Helsinki, 2000), 125-44, at 
131-2.  
53 See e.g. E. Fantham, ‘Mime: The Missing Link in Roman Literary History’, CW 82 (1989), 
153-63, at 161 n. 47 for Lucilius as the possible start of a tradition of divine councils. I do not 
share the opinion supported by O. Skutsch, Studia Enniana (London, 1968), 109-12 that the 
hexameter-ending feruentia rapa uorare (Apocol. 9.5) was originally from Lucilius. 
54 There is no link, contra R. degl’ Innocenti Pierini, ‘Il concilio degli dèi tra Lucilio e 
Ovidio’, A&R 32 (1987), 137-47, with Ov. Met. 1.190-1. However, a better comparison 
involving Carneades might be Cic. Fin. 2.59: ‘as Carneades says, imagine you know that a 
viper is lurking somewhere, and that someone whose death would benefit you is about to sit 
down on it unawares’. 
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Marx’s cetera] morbus, uenenum (‘his countenance is like his face—death, jaundice, poison’, 
37 Warmington = 44 Marx).55  
Such inability was not Carneades’ style:56 in Philostratus’ later Lives of the Sophists, he is 
characterized as memorable ‘in virtue of the force and vigour of his orations’ (1.4), and his 
voice was famously booming (D.L. 4.63).57 His speech indicates not immobility but health 
and strength. And indeed, Clitomachus’ copying out of Carneades’ thoughts (disputatio) on 
suffering the fall of one’s country was ‘a treatment so effective that soon their wounds were 
only scars’ (Cic. Tusc. 3.54):58 Carneadean philosophy has healing powers. Thus, it should 
come as no surprise that Diogenes’ description of Carneades’ death reports that on that 
occasion ‘there was, they say, a lunar eclipse’ (φασιν ἔκλειψιν γενέσθαι σελήνης, 4.64). The 
                                                        
55 Ascribed to Book One by Nonius, here with Scaliger’s rendering icterus for transmitted 
citer, not ‘Lachmann’s’ as claimed at I. Goh, ‘Trebonius’ Allusion to Lucilius (Cic. Fam. 
12.16.3)’, SO 87 (2013), 79-89, at 87, where teter is adopted. I do not see the ‘consternation’ 
that Muecke (n. 11), 46 identifies. Krenkel (n. 10), 1.121 claims that ‘Ein Gott beschreibt den 
Lupus mit kräftigen Worten’. 
56 That said, Diogenes claims that Carneades grew his hair and nails owing to his devotion to 
philosophy (4.62), which suggests an uncivilized and bestial aspect to his lifestyle.   
57 See S. Goldhill, ‘The Anecdote: Exploring the Boundaries between Oral and Literate 
Performance in the Second Sophistic’, in W.A. Johnson and H.N. Parker (edd.), Ancient 
Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome (Oxford, 2009), 96-112, at 106 for 
this passage in the context of the Second Sophistic chreia tradition. 
58 S.A. White, ‘Cicero and the Therapists’, in J.G.F. Powell (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher 
(Oxford, 1995), 219-46, at 242; the Latin seems to indicate that this remedy is as effective as 
the passage of time, with the same kind of ‘even if’ as in 35 Warmington = 31 Marx. Cf. 
Carneades on freedom from pain (Cic. Fin. 2.38). 
21 
 
 
eclipse is the kind of astral phenomenon which accompanies apotheosis:59 so while Diogenes 
merely diagnoses the moon’s sympathy (συμπάθεια), it might not be too far-fetched to say that 
Carneades is located on the cusp of godhead himself. The upshot is that Lucilius’ Concilium 
uses Carneades to toy with the prospect of unexpected divinity for Lupus. Of course, Carneades 
is not coming, but no wonder: in a sense, he’s already there among the gods. 
 
III. PHILOSOPHERS AT PLAY 
 
Several aspects of Carneadean biography seem to be jocular attempts to humanize the 
philosopher, in line with his own penchant for vivid storytelling.60 For instance, Cicero tells a 
                                                        
59 See e.g. S. Cole, Cicero and the Rise of Deification at Rome (Cambridge, 2013), 90 (on 
Cic., Rep. 1.25), 94 (on Rep. 2.17), 100 (on Rep. 6.24)—all concerning Romulus, though cf. 
Plut. Aem. 17.7. H.-A. Gärtner, ‘Politische Deutungen von Sonnenfinsternissen in der 
Antike’, in H. Köhler, H. Görgemanns, and M. Baumbach (edd.), “Sturmend auf finsterem 
Pfad ...”: Ein Symposion zur Sonnenfinsternis in der Antike (Heidelberg, 2000), 35-48, at 44, 
discusses this eclipse at Carneades’ death, recorded in the Suda as a solar eclipse, as intended 
to oppose Carneades, the moon, to Plato, the sun. Thanks to Lynette Mitchell and Karen Ní 
Mheallaigh for assistance on this point. 
60 Cf. J. Annas, ‘Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property’, in M. Griffin & J. 
Barnes (edd.), Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society (Oxford, 
1989), 151-73, at 157: ‘Carneades’ speech [against justice] was clearly a source of good 
examples’. 
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story, which depicts his interaction with a learned and interested Roman, dating from the time 
of the embassy of the philosophers (Luc. 137):61 
 
‘I have read in Clitomachus a bon-mot by Aulus Albinus (the Albinus who was consul 
with your grandfather, Lucullus, and a rather learned man, as the history he wrote in 
Greek shows). The story goes that in the year of his praetorship, under the consuls 
Publius Scipio and Marcus Marcellus, when Carneades and Diogenes the Stoic were 
waiting on the senate in the Capitolium, he quipped: ‘So it’s your impression, Carneades, 
that I am not a praetor, this is not a city, and there are no citizens in it?’ But Carneades 
replied: ‘No, that’s his, the Stoic, view!’ 
 
It is intriguing that the philosophers are made to wait, at the mercy of the senate, in a 
reminiscence of the focus on time in the Lucilian Concilium, as in Neptune’s arguable 
reference to having missed the earlier concilium. But what of Carneades’ destructive criticism 
(and its prompting to disbelieve our senses) now that it is the butt of a joke? Carneadean 
argument allows, it seems, for him to weasel out of a challenge by claiming that the argument 
is owed to an opposing view. The evident flexibility of his views allows for the suspension of 
disbelief. 
Carneades’ ghostly presence, as I have constructed it on the simple fact of his being 
name-checked in 35 Warmington = 31 Marx, is also relevant as a comparandum for the 
putative critique, in Lucilius’ Concilium deorum, of Lupus’ luxurious lifestyle. A line thought 
by commentators to be part of the Concilium seems to depend on a joke whereby Lupus is a 
sea-bass, aptly enough because that is one meaning of his cognomen Lupus, smothered by 
                                                        
61 Cf. Cic. Luc. 98: ‘Carneades used to joke (ludere): “if my conclusion is valid, I stick to it; 
but if it’s invalid, Diogenes should pay me back my mina”’.  
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other, cheaper fishes.62 It is preserved by Varro, De Lingua Latina 7.47: occidunt, Lupe, 
saperdae te et iura siluri (‘O Lupus/sea-bass, the sauces/laws of the shabar-fish and perch are 
the death of you’, 46 Warmington = 54 Marx). I wonder whether the smothering, here 
envisaged happening to Lupus as fish course,63 evokes the famously overwhelming force of 
Carneadean rhetoric.64 This would be a fine irony, because Carneades supposedly told off 
Epicurus for keeping a food diary (Plut. Mor. 1089c). Diogenes Laertius observed that 
Carneades, in similar killjoy vein, ‘declined invitations to dine out’ (4.63), because he was so 
critical and controversial. Carneades’ praise of Empedocles and Pythagoras, as reported by 
Cicero (‘not mediocre men, but very great and learned’, Rep. 3.18), was on the grounds, in 
                                                        
62 C. Connors, ‘Epic Allusion in Roman Satire’, in K. Freudenburg (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Roman Satire (Cambridge, 2005), 123-45, at 127-9. Waszink (n. 51), 270 
notes that Neptune, as god of the sea, may well have spoken this line, and observes the Greek 
diction at 272. 
63 There is here a possible onomastic pun, of the type identified by M. Gale, ‘Etymological 
Wordplay and Poetic Succession in Lucretius’, CPh 96 (2001), 168-72: Carneades’ name 
begins with carn-, the root of the Latin word for ‘flesh’ (caro, carnis, f.). Cf. the second 
Homeric quotation in D.L. 4.63, which incorporates Mentor and thus juxtaposes Homer’s 
Mentor with the interlocutor Mentor who was cuckolding Carneades: M.D. Usher, 
‘Carneades’ Quip: Orality, Philosophy, Wit, and the Poetics of Impromptu Quotation’, Oral 
Tradition 21 (2006), 190-209, at 195. 
64 Cf. e.g. Numenius fr. 27 = Eusebius, Preparation 14.738d: ‘And if there were ever a need 
of marvellous statements, he would rise up as violent as a river in flood, overflowing with 
rapid stream everything on this side and that, and would fall on his hearers and drag them 
along with him in a tumult.’ 
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part, of their refusal to eat meat and therefore to apply the same justice to men as animals.65  
Still, we have at least three instances of Carneadean consumption. He is supposed to have 
purged himself with hellebore, a poison if taken in the wrong dosage, before debating with 
Chrysippus.66 Likewise, when he hears about the Stoic Antipater of Sidon’s suicide by taking 
poison, he calls for some too, and says it will be οἰνόμελι (‘honeyed wine’, D.L. 4.64). And 
as part of the argumentation against Stoic teleology, Carneades adopts—using the same 
methods we saw before—a Stoic position, apparently to ridicule it: ‘but the pig has been born 
for the natural purpose of being slaughtered and eaten’.67 
So how serious was Carneades for Lucilius? The mention of fish, in the last fragment 
from the Concilium discussed, could form part of the legacy of the philosopher-poet Timon 
of Phlius (325-235 B.C.E.), disciple of the older Sceptic Pyrrho. His three-book Silloi, in 
hexameters (the same meter as Lucilius’ Concilium), featured mockery of philosophers in 
both dialogue and monologue form (D.L. 9.111-12). It is likely that Timon’s work featured 
jokes which compared philosophers to fish.68 Moreover, Timon is well known for Homeric 
                                                        
65 See e.g. R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate 
(Ithaca, NY, 1993), 127-8. Cf. Cic. N.D. 3.29, where Carneades is claimed to have argued 
that every living thing is mortal because corporeal and changeable. 
66 Val. Max. 8.7 ext. 5; in Plin. N.H. 25.51, Gell. 17.15 it is Carneades before debating Zeno; 
at Petron. 88.4 it is Chrysippus himself who takes the hellebore; see S. Bartsch, Persius: A 
Study in Food, Philosophy, and the Figural (Chicago, 2015), 88. 
67 Porph. Abst. 3.20.3, with D. Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 2007), 236-8.  
68 I support the cautious conclusions of D.L. Clayman, Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into 
Poetry (Berlin & New York, 2010), 107-12, who is loath to believe in Diel’s influential 
attribution of a full-blown fishing scene to Timon (based on Lucian’s Piscator).  
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parody, and if his lines 805 SH = 31 D and 806 SH = 32 D, both preserved in Diogenes 
Laertius, are (as is likely) parodies of scenes from Odyssey 5, then we should remember that 
Neptune’s regret over having missed a former divine conference also came from that book.69 
I therefore think the opinion of Fiske, who claimed (showing no working) that Lucilius Book 
1 was indebted to Timon’s Silloi, should be resurrected.70 Timon’s Silloi Book 1 (and 
probably 2) may have incorporated a nekuia where the shades of dead philosophers were 
seen, which would have to claim some descent from the Odyssey.71  
With that in mind, we can return to the Carneades fragment which occasioned this 
discussion. The mention of Orcus as having agency in 35 Warmington = 31 Marx serves 
notice that Lucilius’ Concilium is, in effect, a reverse nekuia, both a summoning of the 
recently deceased Lupus and a rejected (though at least mentioned) sending of Carneades 
from the Underworld to the gods, rather than a descent to the Underworld. I wonder whether 
Lucilius’ citation could dovetail with the claim of Diogenes Laertius that Carneades ‘seems 
to have shown some want of courage in the face of death’ (4.64—repeated with slight 
variation at 4.65). That attitude could be the inspiration for a reading of Lucilius’ line as a 
witticism about the remote prospect of Carneades’ being recalled from the dead.  
Considering Timon’s catalogue of philosophers, though, raises an important question: 
how does one tell the massed shades apart? The issue of absence and presence which has 
                                                        
69 For these fragments see now M. Lurie, ‘Der schiffbrüchige Odysseus oder: Wie Arkesilaos 
zum Skeptiker wurde. Zu Timon von Phleius Fr. 806 SH (32 D)’, Philologus 58 (2014), 183-
6, with Clayman (n. 68), 108-9. 
70 Fiske (n. 43), 152-3, endorsed by e.g. A. Richlin, The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and 
Aggression in Roman Humor (New York, 1992), 172. 
71 Clayman (n. 68), 81-3, with W. Ax, ‘Timons Gang in die Unterwelt: Ein Betrag zur 
Geschichte der antiken Literaturparodie’, Hermes 119 (1991), 177-93. 
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been a constant in the argument since Neptune uttered ‘if only Carneades were here … it 
wouldn’t solve anything!’ is crystallized in Cicero’s vivid recollections of Carneades’ 
influence on the topography of his old stamping-ground (Fin. 5.4):72 
 
Not long ago it was Carneades’ stage. I think I see him now (his likeness is well known), 
and I think that the very seat where he sat misses his voice and mourns the loss of a 
towering intellect. 
 
Cicero’s throwaway comment, ‘his likeness is well known’, is germane to our purposes.73 
Can Lucilius bring Carneades and Lupus back to life just by invoking them in the sacred 
space of his Concilium senate, and how would we know it is them?74 Once again, let it be 
stressed that the force of Neptune’s lament is that Carneades, mooted and instantly dismissed, 
absolutely cannot return. Yet Carneadean philosophy, in the discussion of how trust is 
encouraged by a cluster of features rather than just one, does—like Lucilius—use as an 
example (as Sextus Empiricus reports) the figure of a famous philosopher: ‘For we trust that 
                                                        
72 Cicero thus participates in a ‘symbolic heroizing of Carneades’: C. Lévy, ‘The Sceptical 
Academy: Decline and Afterlife’, in R. Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient 
Scepticism (Cambridge, 2010), 81-104, at 83. 
73 Yet the statue of Carneades in Athens which inspired Cicero’s recollection is more 
conciliatory than might be expected from the anger he showed towards the Stoics (‘against 
whose teaching his temper had grown hot’, Cic. Tusc. 5.83): P. Zanker, The Mask of 
Socrates: The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity, tr. A. Shapiro (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 
1995), 180-3. 
74 Cf. Cic. Fat. 19 with its example regarding causation that ‘Carneades is going down to the 
Academy’, and the explanation (with piquant ‘boredom’) at Woolf (n. 4), 90. 
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this is Socrates from the fact that he has all his usual features too: colour, size, shape, 
opinion, ragged cloak, and his being in a place where there is no one indistinguishable from 
him’ (Log. 1.178). This visualization reminds us of my original caveat that Carneades could 
serve as a placeholder for any old philosopher. Lucilius is, in effect, daring us to recognize 
Carneades before the Roman Senate in 155 B.C.E. from the mere mention of his name in a 
negative context in the Concilium—a situation of which Carneades would have disapproved, 
in view of its having too few features to identify him.  
Carneades’ biography and philosophy, then, make him a figure of fun, and this is the 
tenor of the oddly literary anecdote which Diogenes retails about his love life. Carneades is 
said to have quoted Homer and Sophocles in assailing his pupil and love-rival Mentor, when 
trying to ban him from a lecture (D.L. 4.64). First two lines from the Odyssey (4.384, 2.268), 
then a slightly adapted line of Sophocles’ Antigone (203), were quoted, whereupon Mentor 
cited the Iliad in reply: οἱ μὲν ἐκήρυσσον, τοὶ δ’ ἠγείροντο μάλ’ ὦκα (‘those made the 
proclamation, and these quickly assembled’, Il. 2.52).75 Mentor’s comeback, taken from the 
aftermath of Agamemnon’s dream which induces him to bring his troops together and offer 
them, near-disastrously, immediate exit from the Trojan War, is a clever riposte which 
insinuates that Carneades is the credulous victim of a false dream.76 It also suggests that an 
assembly would have turned out badly for Carneades, as Agamemnon’s nearly went seriously 
awry. If Carneades were to suffer from participation in concilia, Lucilius, by having Neptune 
bring up the philosopher’s name, may be alluding to the likelihood that the philosopher, had 
he been sent for, would fail to show himself. Indeed, we may consider whether Carneades 
could be considered a wrongdoer himself, and Lucilius’ mention of his name prompts his 
                                                        
75 Usher (n. 63) has the details, in the context of oral composition in spontaneous philosophy. 
76 Usher (n. 63), 204. 
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audience to consider the prospect of a (multiply) hypothetical trial, held to condemn not 
Lupus but Carneades,77 which could result in exile.78 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Carneades’ biography and philosophy are useful to Lucilius’ Concilium deorum. The one 
admittedly exiguous and flawed clue is the mention of Carneades by name in 35 Warmington 
= 31 Marx. It has been argued here that Lucilius incorporates into his poetry the historical 
coincidence of date for Carneades’ visit to Rome in the embassy of 155 BCE and Lupus’ 
consulship followed by his putative trial for extortion. The fragment with Carneades’ name 
prompts the Lucilian audience to think about the (im)possibility of the philosopher appearing 
before the Senate, either alongside or in place of Lupus, the target of the Concilium. Three 
                                                        
77 Cf. the comparison at Numenius, fr. 27 (= Eusebius, Preparation 14.738d) of Carneades to 
a robber; P. van Nuffelen, Rethinking the Gods: Philosophical Readings of Religion in the 
Post-Hellenistic Period (Cambridge, 2012), 76 is too quick to dismiss this.  
78 Note that Cicero says that Carneades and Clitomachus were ‘in exile’, from Cyrene and 
Carthage respectively, as they lived permanently abroad in Athens (exsilium ... quantum 
tandem a perpetua peregrinatione differt, Tusc. 5.107): the phrasing is suggestive for the 
similarity of Carneades and Lupus here posited, given that, although repetundae was not a 
capital charge (cf. A.N. Sherwin-White, ‘The Extortion Procedure Again’, JRS 42 [1952], 43-
55), those convicted routinely fled Rome to avoid paying large sums of money in damages: 
see e.g. M.C. Alexander, ‘How Many Roman Senators were ever Prosecuted? The Evidence 
from the Late Republic’, Phoenix 47 (1993), 238-55, at 243-4. The Tusc. 5 passage is linked 
to the Luc. 137 joke (reproduced above) by A.M. Ioppolo, ‘Carneade e il terzo libro delle 
Tusculanae’, Elenchos 1 (1980), 76-91, at 89-90. 
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further reasons for mentioning Carneades are: that he was known for arguing both sides of a 
question, especially with regard to the Stoics, whose arguments he would adopt for the sake 
of argument—rather like Lucilius, who is sometimes labelled a Stoic; for his questioning of 
the gods, one of whom (known from Homer for missing concilia) utters the line mentioning 
Carneades; and for being a subject of anecdote, despite an abstemious lifestyle. The citation 
of Carneades fits Lucilius’ Concilium into the parodic mode of Timon of Phlius, if we accept 
the poet’s challenge, relevant to Carneades’ own thoughts about believing one’s judgement, 
to see the philosopher in the Concilium in the first place. That challenge, essentially the 
putting of philosophy and philosopher into satiric verse, is one of which it is to be suspected 
that the philosopher Carneades would have tolerated, if not approved: Carneades does not 
criticize the deployment of poetry in philosophical argument tout court. When he objects (in 
the record of Cicero citing Antiochus, Tusc. 3.59-60) to the quoting of Euripides (in this case 
specifically Hypsipyle, fr. 757.921-5 Kannicht), it is purely because to discuss how humans 
are subject to cruel necessity is no consolation at all.79 While it is too much to claim that 
Lucilius’ use of Carneades prefigures Juvenal’s exempla of Democritus and (to a lesser 
extent) Heraclitus at 10.28-35 and 10.47-53,80 or indeed that it holds the key to Lucilius’ 
                                                        
79 Despite what Sextus Empiricus says about ‘the myth-making of poets ... full of every 
impiety’ (M 9.192), and contra D. Wardle, Cicero on Divination: De divinatione, Book 1 
(Oxford, 2006), 132 on Cic. Div. 1.13. R.R. Caston, ‘Pacuvius hoc melius quam Sophocles: 
Cicero’s use of drama in the treatment of the emotions’, in D. Cairns & L. Fulkerson (edd.), 
Emotions between Greece and Rome (London, 2015), 129-48, at 147 claims that Carneades 
here ‘shows an unwillingness to confront pain in a realistic way’. 
80 See now C. Keane, Juvenal and the Satiric Genre (Oxford, 2015), 117-48, with Lucilius’ 
uirtus fragment referred to at 149. 
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wider religious outlook,81 the arguments here have aimed to provide an historical 
contextualisation of the Concilium in line with Carneades’ biography, in ways which avert 
scepticism about what the fragments of a satiric treatment of the Sceptic philosopher might 
tell us.82 
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81 See, for another example beyond the Concilium, e.g. D. Feeney, Literature and Religion at 
Rome (Cambridge, 1998), 93-4. 
82 This article has been helped by advice from many readers, both anonymous and known to 
the author, including Alessandro Barchiesi, Kirk Freudenburg and Emily Gowers, and the 
editors of CQ. A large debt is also owed to audiences at Boston University, especially James 
Uden, and Dartmouth College, particularly Michael Lurie and Roberta Stewart, with special 
thanks to Margaret Graver. 
